Chapter III
Labor Cannibalism and the Courts

"You seem.... to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions - a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps." Thomas Jefferson

Now that we understand the foundation of servitude and how gradual socialism traps people in a process of increasing servitude, let's start examining the house of servitude that has been built upon the labor foundation, or, perhaps I should say, built upon the slave property foundation. For those of you who don't know what "slave property" is, we'll let Jefferson Davis, who was President of the Confederate States during the Civil War, tell you. In a speech he gave in Portland, Maine on September 11, 1858, he said: "In the case of property in the labor of man, or what is usually called slave property...."1

The research I have done has shown me that free labor is the foundation of all other rights. Once power over labor is secured by the force of law, all other liberties are destroyed over time until all that remains are the privileges the masters grant you in the laws they write. The house of servitude recognizes no inalienable rights. Therefore servitude destroys all rights and replaces them with the political privileges of the masters. In the very beginning of the Dred Scott case, we read: "Declaration of Independence does not include slaves as part of the people." Slaves have no inalienable rights, especially the inalienable right to free labor.

The first thing the labor cannibals have to do when transforming the system from a free labor system to a system of servitude is destroy the independence of the judicial system. No house of servitude can function smoothly with liberty friendly judges on the bench. You can't have judges out there that will interfere with the enforcement of the cannibalistic slave codes. So you replace the liberty friendly judges with judges that are dedicated to labor cannibalism. Consider what the majority of people in the 1936 election let FDR do with the Supreme Court. The vicious attack on the Supreme Court can be read in the appendix in a three part series of Saturday Evening Post articles from 1937 entitled "The 168 Days." I've also included in the appendix the complete editorial by George Lorimer entitled "The Constitutional Issue," from the March 14, 1936 issue of The Saturday Evening Post.

The attack on the Supreme Court worked, and, according to Judge Napolitano's research, between 1937 and 1997 not one federal law was declared unconstitutional. In the 4 years from 1937 to 1941, FDR was able to appoint seven new justices to the Supreme Court, thereby destroying the liberty friendly Court. One of the people he appointed was one of his closest associates, Felix Frankfurter. He was put on the bench in 1939 and stayed there until his death in 1962. The first Agricultural Adjustment Act Administrator was a fellow named George Peek. He wrote a series of articles for The Saturday Evening Post in 1936 entitled "In and Out." Consider this excerpt from the first of his series of articles:

"I went into the Roosevelt Administration because I saw a chance to do something for agriculture and, through agriculture, for the nation. I got out when I saw I had no chance there to do anything either for agriculture or for the nation. I am in politics for agriculture - not in agriculture for politics. I had left the Republican Party to support Alfred E. Smith in 1928 because he promised to put into effect the farm program which I had been working on as far back as 1922. I worked for the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt because he seemed to comprehend the farm situation and promised to try to solve it along the lines a group of us had been steadily advocating. I entered what I thought was a Democratic Administration, not because it was Democratic but because it was pledged to a certain course of action. I eventually found that I was not in a Democratic Administration but in a curious collection of socialists and internationalists that were neither Republicans nor Democrats. They, fanaticlike, believed that their objectives transcended the objectives of ordinary human beings and therefore they could not allow themselves to be hampered by platform pledges, or by the Constitution. There were two broad general groups - the socialists and the internationalists. The socialists or, more strictly, the collectivists seemed - for nothing was in the open - to be headed by Felix Frankfurter, Rexford G. Tugwell and Jerome Frank. They gained the mind of the Secretary of Agriculture and had a good deal of sway throughout the Department. The internationalists ruled by the State Department and were headed by Secretary Hull and Assistant Secretary Sayre. Those within the groups had many divergent aims. Secretary Wallace, who had an elastic mind capable of any stretching, alone managed to be in both groups.... A plague of young lawyers on settled on Washington. They all claimed to be friends of somebody or other and mostly of Felix Frankfurter and Jerome Frank. They floated airily into offices, took desks, asked for papers and found no end of things to be busy about. I never found out why they came, or what they did or why they left. Perhaps all of them expected to be hired and perhaps some of them were hired. I only know that in the legal division were formed the plans which eventually turned the AAA from a device to aid the farmers into a device to introduce the collectivist system of agriculture into this country..... They were going to inform the established lawyers and the Supreme Court what the law really was."2

I found this interesting. Nowhere in history class while attending the government schools did I ever read that Franklin Roosevelt appointed a man reported in the press to be a socialist to the bench of the Supreme Court, or that FDR was himself embraced socialist doctrines. Peek pointed out that the Constitution was not going to hamper men like Frankfurter. Their motto should have been: The Constitution be damned - full speed ahead! In a Saturday Evening Post article entitled "Stumbling Into Socialism," which appeared in July of 1935, we read:

"Ask an English Socialist, H.N. Brailsford, what he thinks of the New Deal or Socialism in the United States, and he says: ‘In America, the average man has not the faintest idea of what socialism means. It is, therefore, conceivable that the logic of facts may drive him into it before he can shrink back in terror. He has begun to experiment, and when once Americans start moving as a mass, they are apt to go at a hot and headlong pace. If ever they do it, they will stumble into socialism unconsciously. It will be the consequence of their actions and not the conclusion of their reasoning. And when it is realized, they will believe it is a American invention patented in 1933.'......the New Deal has put into effect many parts of the Socialist program."3

This article laid the Socialist Party Platform of 1932 by the what the New Deal was doing and showed that's all the New Deal was - The Socialist Party Platform of 1932 in action. That's where Social Security came from - The Socialist Party Platform of 1932. It had nothing to do with the Democratic Party Platform of 1932, which was utterly abandoned after FDR took office in 1933.

But going back to the socialist fellow named Felix Frankfurter whom FDR put on the Supreme Court in 1939. He was part of the "Brain Trust" that wrote the great mass of New Deal laws that the congress rubber-stamped. He was already a seasoned veteran at constitutional abuse before his appointment to the Court. In fact, he was one of the leaders of the "Brain Trust." No doubt he wrote and/or supervised the writing of a lot of unconstitutional laws before he was appointed to the Supreme Court. Since he wasn't elected by the people to Congress, he had no constitutional authority to write law, and he knew that. Let's examine one of the first cases he wrote an opinion on. The case was O'Malley v. Woodrough, and was reported on in the May 29, 1939 issue of Time magazine in the National Affairs section. Here we read: "For the first time since age purged the U.S. Supreme Court for Franklin Roosevelt, his four appointees lined up to give the New Deal a victory which it could not have had otherwise..... Until this week courts had held that Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution meant that the Federal Government could not tax its judges' salaries. The inference that Congress might sway justice by slapping taxes on its dispensers. That interpretation, acid-tongued Felix Frankfurter in effect ruled this week, is so much tommyrot: ‘To suggest that [taxing them] makes inroads on the independence of judges...... is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguard...... of the Constitution. To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens."

The District Court upheld the constitutional provision, but Frankfurter and his socialist minded brethren on the New Deal Supreme Court reversed the District Court and upheld taxation upon the salaries of federal judges. His opinion is one of the strangest Supreme Court opinions I've read. He could cite no prior decision of the Supreme Court to back up his position. Why? Simple - they didn't exist. The Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld the constitutional provision that judges shall receive a compensation that is not to be diminished, and any person with common sense can see that taxing the judge's salary diminishes that salary. In addition, taxing the salaries of judges, and for that matter, taxing the wages and salaries of government workers and officers in general is absurd. Why? Because you're taxing tax money. People in the private sector of the economy are taxed to pay the wages and salaries of government workers and officers, and then you turn around and tax the tax money? How does that create any additional revenue? It's like a cow that grazes in the field and then rests, and while resting the cow burps up a cud to chew on. Does the cud provide the cow with any additional food to digest? Of course not. The cud came from food already eaten. The same is true with taxing tax money. It's simply the cud the government cow chews on. So then, what's the real reason for taxing tax money? As far as judges are concerned, the IRS club now hangs over them in tax cases, thus giving an advantage to the labor cannibals in tax cases. In general, the main purpose of taxing tax money is psychological. The objective of the labor cannibals is to condition the minds of all people that they have a legal duty to file and pay income tax, whether the tax produces revenue or not. After all, the sun does revolve around the earth, doesn't it? That Galileo fellow was a liar, wasn't he? Don't believe him! It is also interesting to note that "The Public Salary Tax Act" was rubber-stamped by congress that same year imposing taxes across the board on the wages and salaries of all government workers and officers. It is obvious that the labor cannibals want an unlimited and unrestrained power of taxation. From 1937 until now, I have not been able to find one Supreme Court decision that has held any federal tax law unconstitutional. Packing the Court works quite well, doesn't it? You can thank the voters of 1936 for that.

Justice Butler was the lone dissenter in the O'Malley case. He died later that year. He concluded his dissent by saying: "For one convinced that the judgement now given is wrong, it is impossible to acquiesce or merely to note dissent. And so this opinion is written to indicate the grounds of opposition and to evidence regret that another landmark has been removed."4 The greatest landmark of all that was removed by the New Deal was the people's free labor market when the Social Security Act became law.

The challenge to the Social Security Act came before the Supreme Court in the 1937 term. There were two cases: Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis and Helvering v. Davis. The Social Security Act was upheld by a narrow 5-4 margin, and the dissenting opinions were some of the strongest you'll read in the opinions of the Supreme Court. One thing that caught my eye was in the Helvering case, where we read: "The District Court held that a tax upon employees was not properly at issue, and that the tax upon employers was constitutional."5 You see, the attorneys representing Helvering tried to get the court to rule on the constitutionality of a direct tax upon the wages of Helvering's employees. The court refused to do so because Helvering, the employer, was before the court, and therefore the court declined to take up that question, even though the question of directly taxing the labor of working people was a serious constitutional issue. Back in 1886, in the case of Boyd v. U.S., we read: "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." I hate to tell you, but those types of courts don't exist any more. So, where is the case that has legalized a direct tax upon the labor (wages) of working people? I haven't been able to find one Supreme Court case that has ruled on this issue, and I methodically went through the Supreme Court Reporters, year by year, looking for it. It's not there. Don't you find that a little strange? For seven decades the Federal Government has been taxing the labor of working people and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this serious constitutional question. But they did come close once.

The case was Cheek v. U.S., and was decided in the 1990 term. This was the first case I found where a wage earner stood before the Supreme Court that had challenged the federal income tax laws. Cheek was an airline pilot, and no doubt his wages were better than most workers, but wages are a reflection of a person's labor, no matter what the wage being paid is. Cheek had been convicted of tax crimes in the District Court and the Supreme Court reversed his conviction on the statutory ground of "willfulness." Since the Court reversed his conviction on a statutory ground, they avoided the constitutional question of a direct tax upon Cheek's labor. But the Court did say this: "It is common ground that this Court, where possible, interprets congressional enactments so as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions."6 Cheek did not make labor an issue in his case. Instead he relied on what he had learned from others, and the arguments he relied upon have been repeatedly rejected by the lower courts. The Court did say that Cheek was free to present his constitutional arguments, rather than relying on the statutory "willfulness" defense, but the Court said "he must run the risk of being wrong."7 I would dissent from this. The real risk is the risk of arguing a case before judges that have no respect for the truth and are pledged to create whatever legal fictions are necessary to make labor cannibalism appear legal. One example of the fictions that the courts have created since their packing during the New Deal is the fiction that wages are income in the legal sense of the term. In footnote #7 in the case we read what the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had to say about arguments like the ones Cheek was making. The Seventh Circuit Court said that such arguments were the "stock arguments of the tax protestor movement," and that they would never be "considered ‘objectively reasonable' by this court." One being "the belief that wages are not income and therefore are not subject to the federal income tax laws." This is a classic example of a fiction of law created by judges dedicated to labor cannibalism. "Fiction," in the 1940 edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionaryis defined as: "The legal assumption that something which is or may be false is true." Income, legally defined, is limited to gains and profits. As the Supreme Court said in a case not long after the income tax began with the 16th amendment: "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."8 Does anybody see wages fitting into this definition? Are wages a gain derived from labor? Recall that George Lorimer, in 1934, said that the income tax was a tax upon "the builders of great fortunes"? So let's use an example. Let's say I have some investment capital. I buy a factory and set it up to manufacture a product. I hire workers (labor) to work in the factory. I manufacture my product and sell it on the market. The money I get from selling my product minus my expenses (capital and labor) is a gain, and therefore the type of income the Eisner Court was defining. In the 1962 term of the Supreme Court, in the case of U.S. v. Gilmore, the Court said that " production of income is a profit-seeking activity." But that's not the way we're supposed to think today, is it? We're supposed to think that our wages are income in the legal sense and that government can tax those wages to any degree they wish. Do you think that way? People who study law know that the legal definitions of words are usually more restricted than the general definitions as found in a standard dictionary such as Webster's. For example, one of the legal definitions of the word "bar" is "a particular part of the court- room." Well then, the next time I "stand before the bar," I want the judge to serve me up a cold beer when I get thirsty. I don't think the folks that rule over us have a problem with sticking to the legal definition of the word "bar," but they definitely have a problem with sticking to the legal definition of "income." After all, Aaron Russo, in his recent documentary "America - From Freedom to Fascism" pointed out that in 2005 the labor harvest was over $927 billion. Do you really think that the labor cannibals will give up such enormous power? If you had the power to change the legal definition of a word for a trillion dollars, would you do it if you were on the receiving end of the trillion dollars? The Constitution be damned - full speed ahead!

Another important thing from the Cheek case is where the Court said: "Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law rule has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal statutes.... The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the laws. Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term "willfully" as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws."9 This is not why the word "willful" was put in the tax laws by Congress. It's just another fiction the courts have created. I will now show you the real reason why the word "willful" was added to the federal tax laws. On June 22, 1935, a Saturday Evening Post article entitled "Surrender Of The Purse" (part 1), by Garet Garrett showed me something that Herbert Hoover warned about in an article he wrote from the previous year. Mr. Hoover said that the continuation of New Deal policies would result in the vesting of taxing powers in Executive officials. That's what this article and another one two weeks later was all about - the Executive branch was taking over the taxing powers from Congress, and Congress let this happen too. Read some excerpts from this article:

".....and yet, only 5 years ago scarcely anyone could have believed that with 3 hours of debate the House of Representatives would enthusiastically surrender control of the public purse to the President.

That happened in January last. You will find the story of it - part of it - by reference to H.J. Res. 117 in the Congressional Record.

The House of Representatives did not write the bill, nor did it originate in the House but in the technical sense that the House acted on it first.

Mr Fish: Who was the author of this legislation?

Mr. Sabbath: The President of the United States.

Mr. Fish: Does the gentleman speak with authority?

Mr. Sabbath: Yes"9

A "gage rule" was imposed upon the entire Revenue Bill of 1935. The entire bill was sent to Congress with the command from FDR and his associates not change or amend it. With this in mind, let's read some more.

"Nevertheless, it was only after a minority of Democrats, uniting with Republicans, that obliged the administration forces to open Sections 4 and 6 to amendment. That was the utmost concession.

It was permitted in the House to debate this language, but not to touch it. That part of the text was sacred where the administration forces were in control. They were not strong enough, however, to withhold Sections 4 and 6 from amendment. Those contained the grants of administrative power.

Paragraph (c) of Section 4 authorized the President to -

‘Consolidate, redistribute, abolish or transfer the functions and/or duties of, and transfer the property and/or personnel of, any governmental agency (including a corporation).'

The unlimited word there was ‘any'. The President would have received the power to change or abolish any governmental agency whatever. By amendment, the word ‘emergency' was inserted after the word ‘any', making it read that the President could change or abolish only ‘any emergency' agency of the Government.

Paragraph (d) of Section 4 gave the President power to -

‘Post pone, but not beyond June 30, 1937, the termination of the existence of any existing governmental agency (including a corporation) designated and utilized under this section.'

What did that mean? It was thought to mean that, as to NRA, for example, the President would have only in some way to designate and utilize it under H.J Res. 117 in order to possess the power to extend it for two years, with no let or hindrance by Congress. The House struck that out. Then Section 6, authorizing the President to prescribe such rules and regulations as he might deem necessary to carry out the purposes of the resolution- all, so far, as usual- but then going on to say, ‘and any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by a fine of not to exceed $5000 or imprisonment for not to exceed two years, or both.'

What did that paragraph mean? It meant that Congress would be delegating to the President the power in his own discretion to make innumerable rules and regulations that would have the force of criminal law- therefore, himself to impose upon the country a new body of criminal statutes. It meant more than that. The President having been authorized to delegate the power delegated to him, it meant that bureaus in Washington- bureaus to an unprecedented number and of kinds yet to be created- severally pursuing ideas of how to promote the general welfare, ideas of relieving economic maladjustments, ideas of improving living and working conditions, would have the power to make innumerable rules and regulations, each to have the force of criminal law. Bureaus, therefore, appointed bureaucrats, imposing upon the country an unlimited number and variety of what, in effect, would be criminal statutes.

What the House did with that paragraph was to write the word ‘willful' into the text, after the word ‘any', making it to read for ‘any willful violation'; then to insert a period after $5000, and strike out the words, ‘or imprisonment for not to exceed two years, or both.'"10

So, after reading this, what do you think the real reason was why the word "willful" was put in the federal criminal tax laws? Was is because of the complexity of the tax codes as the Supreme Court asserts? Or was it to give some shield of protection from the constitutional abuses of the Executive branch of government that had just usurped the taxing powers of Congress in violation of the Constitution itself? I guess it only stood to reason if the Congress surrendered their legislative powers to the Executive, it would soon surrender its taxing powers too. You see, without the "willful" requirement being attached to the alleged tax crime, all that the jury would consider would be whether or not you filed and paid or not and then render a verdict. But the "willful" thing was a smart move by some House members back then. Now the state of mind of the accused comes into play, and makes prosecution more difficult. They knew what was happening. They knew that they were surrendering enormous powers to non-elected bureaucrats in the Executive branch. Now you know the rest of the story. In the May 11, 1936 issue of Time magazine, in the National Affairs section, under the sub-heading "Taxation - House Default," we read: "‘Step by step,' gloomed Representative James W. Wadsworth in the House one day last fortnight, ‘the House of Representatives is losing its place as an institution...... We do not originate much more than the enacting clause of most legislation.' No member of the House had anything to do with the writing of the tax bill that was before them, but they passed it 267 to 93 anyway." So, the 1936 revenue bill was written by the Executive Bureaucracy too. At least in 1935 a few members of the House got to put a word or two in; and one of the words was "willful." The IRS code that exists today is the not the product of the elected representatives of Congress, for they did not write any of it, except maybe for a word or two. The IRS code of today is a de facto tax code with no constitutional authority. Acting as a rubber stamp is not what the framers of the Constitution had in mind when it came to Congress exercising legislative or taxing powers, but we must remember that the Constitution is in exile. The intent of the dead framers of the Constitution be damned!

Let's look at another case that came before the Supreme Court of Labor Cannibalism. In the 1981 term the case of U.S. v. Lee came before the Court. It was a case involving the Amish people and social security taxes. The case starts by saying: "Employer, a member of the old order Amish who employed several other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop, sued for refund of taxes, claiming that imposition of social security taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise rights and those of his Amish employees." Surprisingly, the District Court sided with Lee and ruled in his favor, but the Supreme Court of Labor Cannibalism reversed to lower court and upheld the taxation. The Court further stated: "Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional and state may justify limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish overriding government interest." This is pretty easy to understand. The Court could have also said: "If the government wants something bad enough, we'll legalize it - the Constitution be damned." It would mean the same thing. I just worded it bluntly.

Now let's look at how the District Courts treat federal tax prosecutions against wage earners. In the Cheek case, the jury, after several hours of deliberation, sent a note to the judge stating that "We have a basic disagreement between some of us as to if Mr. Cheek honestly and reasonably believed he was not required to pay income taxes."11 The judge responded with additional jury instructions that said: "A person's opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law. Furthermore, a person's disagreement with the government's tax collecting system and policies does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law."12 In short, the judge was just saying to find the disobedient slave guilty and let's get the trial over with, which they did. But a note signed by all 12 jurors directed to the judge did say "that although the jury found the petitioner guilty, several jurors wanted to express their personal opinions of the case and that notes from the individual jurors to the court were ‘a complaint against the narrow and hard expression under the constraints of the law.'" (footnote #6)

A more resent case I found where a wage earner was criminally prosecuted by the feds was one that was prosecuted in Alaska. Like the Cheek case, this one was against a wage earner that was on the high end of the wage earning scale. The case was U.S. v. Harpole, and was prosecuted in June, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for Alaska. According to the Indictment, Harpole didn't file or pay federal income tax from 1997 - 2002. Harpole, born back in 1950, had worked on diesel generators for many years and was very good at his trade and his wages reflected that. In pre civil war times, for example, Frederick Douglass, in his prime, was worth a lot as a slave because he made his masters a lot of money. On the other hand, "Uncle" Isaac Copper wasn't worth anything as a slave. Why? Douglass said: "He was a confirmed cripple, wholly unable to work, and was worth nothing for sale in the market."13 The value is in the labor. It always has been. A cripple, for example, couldn't pick any cotton, and therefore wasn't worth anything. Harpole worked for oil companies on "the Slope" in Alaska. In 1997, he earned $62,739; in 1998, he earned $70,115; in 1999, he earned $67,089; in 2000, he earned $71,313; in 2001, he earned $88,297; and in 2002, he earned $105,050. How would you like to earn wages like that? The record does show that Harpole put in a lot of overtime too. Harpole, like Cheek, was convicted by a jury. Harpole also relied on arguments that were not his own, but what he learned from others. He tried to argue that he was a "non-resident alien" and therefore exempt from income taxation. If I was a juror and had filed and paid income tax all my life, I doubt that the "non-resident alien" argument would have made much sense to me either, but there are some gems from this case that need to be brought into the light, for all institutions of slavery have their common characteristics, and Harpole's trial was nothing more than the feds punishing a disobedient slave. People have not completely lost their instincts. As Herbert Hoover stated back in 1934: "Perhaps not one in a hundred thousand of our people knows the detailed list of liberties our forefathers insisted upon, or the development of them since, but never a day goes by that every man and woman instinctively rely upon those liberties."14 There are two articles in the appendix by Mr. Hoover from 1934 that are very important because they shed light on what has happened to us and why our way of thinking is the way it is today. They are "The Challenge to Liberty" and "Consequences to Liberty of Regimentation."

On day 4 of the trial, June 24, 2004, Harpole took the stand in his own defense. One of the starting questions that his attorney, Larry Beacraft, asked was: "Mr. Harpole, can you inform the jury as to where you were born and what you did in your early life?" To this, Mr Harpole replied: "Well, I was born in 1950 in Alvin, Texas. At the age of 14, I went to work for a farmer there in east Texas. We - we raised a lot of watermelons and sweet potatoes and had a small dairy. At that time, the - the farmer instructed me to go and get a Social Security number so he could pay me. So I did."

Here we can see that the principle "no social security number - no pay" has been around for a long time, but Harpole didn't get his number at birth, he got it so he could get paid when he was 14 years old. Children did not get the number at birth back in the mid 1960's, and I didn't get mine until the early 1970's when my Agriculture teacher, Mr. Profit, asked us when we were freshmen in High School if we had one. He said something like: "Boys, all of y'all that don't have a social security number raise yer hands." I recall that over half of the class raised their hands. So Mr. Profit gave us the forms to fill out and we got our social security cards shortly thereafter. Mr. Profit handed them out to us when they came in. But at that young age we had no idea the number would be used to identify our labor as articles of commerce to be taxed an garnished at the pleasure of the ruling powers. After all, we were only in the 9th grade when we got our numbers. Now they're assigned at birth.

Now let's look at some of the cross-examination of the U.S. Prosecutor, Mr. Bradley.

Mr. Bradley: "Please look at 2-2. That's your 1995 return with the zeroes on it. Do you remember this? And you put zeroes down under wages. How much - how much money were you making in 1995? How'd you get paid when you were working for VECO? Did you get paid a salary? Did you get paid hourly?"

Mr. Harpole: "By the hour."

Mr. Bradley: "Did you get overtime?"

Mr. Harpole: "Well, it's 12 hours a day. So --"

Mr. Bradley: "So how did that - how much were you being paid an hour in 1995?"

Mr. Harpole: "I can't recall exactly. I'm going to say in the neighborhood of -- in '95?"

Mr. Bradley: "Yes, sir."

Mr. Harpole: "Probably in the neighborhood of $20. I don't know for sure."

Mr. Bradley: "And that was for 12 hours a day?"

Mr. Harpole: "Yes, at least."

Mr. Bradley: "Seven days a week, two weeks at a time?"

Mr. Harpole: "Correct"

It's obvious that Harpole put in a lot of hours of hard work to earn the money he was paid, but the one question and answer that caught my attention the most was this one.

Mr. Bradley: "You wanted them to stop taking money out of your check?"

Mr. Harpole: "Yes. I felt like the money was mine."

Back in pre civil war times, a fellow named Frederick Douglass thought that what he was paid for his labor belonged to him too, but the way he felt didn't matter much back in his day either. People need to realize that once a taxing power is legalized by the courts, the politicians can increase the tax to whatever limits they desire. Let's see what Frederick Douglass had to say about his master taking his wages.

"Why should I be a slave? There was no reason why I should be the thrall of any man. Besides, I was now getting, as I have said, a dollar and fifty cents per day. I contracted for it, worked for it, collected it; it was paid to me, and it was rightfully my own; and yet upon every returning Saturday night, this money - my own hard earnings, every cent of it - was demanded of me and taken by Master Hugh. He did not earn it; he had no hand in earning it; why, then, should he have it?.... The right to take my earnings was the right of the robber. He had the power to compel me to give him the fruits of my labor, and this power was the only right in the case. I became more and more dissatisfied with this state of things, and in so becoming I only gave proof of the same human nature which every reader of this chapter in my life - slaveholder or non- slaveholder - is conscious of possessing...... To make a contented slave, you must make a thoughtless one. It is necessary to darken his moral and mental vision, and, as far as possible, to annihilate his power of reason. He must be able to detect no inconsistencies in slavery. The man who takes his earnings must convince him that he has a perfect right to do so. It must not depend on force: the slave must know no higher law than his master's will. The whole relationship must not only demonstrate to his mind its necessity, but its absolute rightfulness. If there be one crevice through which a single drop can fall, it will certainly rust off the slave's chain."15

Douglass, as we can see, didn't like someone taking the fruits of his labor away from him. He thought that the fruits of his labor belonged to him, and that no one else had the right to take his labor away from him against his will. Harpole felt the same way, but didn't understand the slavery argument.

"The practice from week to week of openly robbing me of all my earnings, kept the nature and character of slavery constantly before me. I could be robbed by indirection, but this was too open and barefaced to be endured. I could see no reason why I should, at the end of each week, pour the reward of my honest toil into the purse of my master. My obligation to do this vexed me, and the manner in which Master Hugh received my wages vexed me even more. Carefully counting out the money, and rolling it out dollar by dollar, he would look me in the face as if he would search my heart as well as my pocket, and reproachfully ask me, ‘Is that all?' - implying that I had perhaps kept back part of my wages; or, if not so, the demand was made possibly to make me feel that after all, I was an ‘unprofitable servant.' Draining me of the last cent of my hard earnings, he would, however, occasionally, when I brought home an extra large sum, dole out to me a sixpence or a shilling, with a view, perhaps, of kindling up my gratitude. But it had the opposite effect; it was an admission to my right of the whole sum. The fact that he gave me any part of my wages, was proof that he suspected I had a right to the whole of them; and I always felt uncomfortable after having received anything in this way, lest his giving me a few cents might possibly ease his conscience, and make him feel himself to be a pretty honorable robber after all."16

Douglass was obviously referring to Luke 17: 7-10 when he talked about being an "unprofitable servant." Let's see what this says.

"But which of you, having a servant plowing or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat? And will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me, till I have eaten and drunken; and afterward thou shalt eat and drink? Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do."

Jesus knew the mentality of masters; and he knew that they showed no gratitude towards a slave that was just doing what he was supposed to, and masters did not hesitate to punish their slaves for disobedience. This quote came from the King James Bible. Another Bible version says "We are good-for-nothing slaves: what we have done is what we ought to have done." I submit that this is the scripture that ministers and preachers should use when telling people that it's their Christian duty to pay all taxes and fees that the rulers impose upon their labor, and not the "give unto Caesar" passage found at Matthew 22: 21. So, the next time you pay all taxes and fees on your labor; and fill out all the forms that the labor cannibals demand that you fill out; remember that: "We are good-for-nothing slaves: what we have done is what we ought to have done." Do not be an "unprofitable servant" by cheating either. After all, as the Reverend Doctor Thornton Springfellow told us in Cotton is King: "the slave is the master's money," and according most religious leaders today, we have no right as Christians to deny the master what rightfully belongs to him.

Master Hugh did grant Douglass' request to let him go out and work on his own and pay him a fee for the privilege. Douglass said:

"After mature reflection, as I suppose it was, Master Hugh granted me the privilege in question, on the following terms: I was to be allowed all my time; to make all bargains for work, and to collect my own wages; and in return for this liberty, I was required or obliged to pay him three dollars at the end of each week, and to board and clothe myself, and buy my own caulking tools. A failure in any of these particulars would put an end to the privilege. This was a hard bargain. The wear and tear of clothing, the losing and breaking of tools, and the expense of board made it necessary for me to earn at least six dollars a week to keep even with the world...... Master Hugh seemed much pleased with this arrangement for a time; and well he might be, for it was decidedly in his favor. It relieved him of all anxiety concerning me. His money was sure. He had armed my love of liberty with a lash and a driver far more efficient than any I had before known; and while he derived all the benefits of slaveholding by the arrangement, without its evils, I endured all the evils of being a slave, and yet suffered all the care and anxiety of a responsible freeman."17

Since Master Hugh owned the rights to Douglass' labor, he had the right to determine the allowance Douglass received from his labor. He could set the allowance from 1% to 99%. After all, he was the master, and Douglass was the slave. How comfortable a slave lives has always been contingent upon the benevolence of the master.

Harpole was sentenced to 21 months in federal prison and a $5000 fine. He also has to pay the back taxes he was alleged to owe with penalties and interest. He did not appeal. During sentencing, Harpole told the Court: "Your Honor, I want to -- I want to basically admit that I -- that I made a mistake based on my understanding of the -- of the cases and -- and some government materials that I consulted." An email correspondence I had with Mr. Beacraft informed me that he no longer had contact with Mr. Harpole, and that he had told him he would conform to the system from now on and get all the benefits from the system he could since that's the way most people are today. After all, if you can't beat ‘em, join ‘em! But reading the transcripts of the Harpole trial shows that criminal prosecutions in tax cases are a lot more difficult because they have to prove the defendant acted "willfully." Those House members back in 1935 were pretty smart to put that in the Executive tax codes. We should be thankful that they got to put in a word or two.

On December 27, 1997, I filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court in Denver, Colorado that challenged the income tax on slavery grounds. The Timothy McVeigh trial was over and the Terry Nichols trial was in its sentencing phase at the time. All the media platforms were still set up when I took my box with my pleadings into the courthouse and filed my suit. Based upon my legal and historical research, there was no doubt in my mind that the income tax had been perverted into a general labor tax that violated the 13th amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. I stopped filing and paying income tax on my labor to put the system to the test. I was able to find a builder that let me contract my labor framing houses without giving a social security number. Eventually, the IRS contacted the builder and instructed them to begin "backup withholding" on my pay. This ordered the builder to begin withholding 31% of my labor each time I was paid. Since this was a trespass upon my labor, I filed what is known as a Biven'saction, which is a constitutional tort action. I refused to be enslaved in this manner so I quit framing houses for this builder and went to work elsewhere. My arguments were not those from other people, but my own based upon what I had learned from my own research. I did not file suit against then IRS or the United States. I filed suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS Commissioner personally because the Congress, in surrendering their taxing powers to the Executive branch, made the Secretary of the Treasury and the IRS Commissioner the taxing overlords of labor in the United States. So I figured, what the hell, sue the masters. The case was Banks v. Rubin. I didn't get a hearing. I was ignored like the plague by the court, but I did get a response to my complaint from the labor cannibals. On page 7 of their "United States' Motion to Dismiss," U.S. Trial Attorney with the Tax Division, Arthur Yoon, stated: "Consequently, plaintiff's first request that the court permanently enjoin defendants from ‘enforcing their tax codes on plaintiff's labor' seeks to frustrate those objectives and should be denied." You see, I was seeking a permanent injunction that would bar any federal or state power from taxing my labor unless the due process of the 13th amendment was respected. The "objectives" that I was trying to frustrate were the tax collecting efforts that are being enforced upon the labor of working people in violation of the 13th amendment. There's something about the Dred Scott decision that is very important to remember. Lincoln pointed this out in one of his speeches:

"What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First - they decide upon the question before the court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands are as he is."18

I knew that when I filed my suit I had started the next Dred Scott decision, and I submit that the court knew this. That's why I was ignored. They didn't want to deal with such a case. But the claim that was made upon my labor in the "United States' Motion to Dismiss" reveals the fact that the labor cannibals believe they have the authority to tax my labor, and the way that they view my labor is the way they view the labor of all working people. I promptly responded to their motion to dismiss in accordance with the court rules. They failed to respond according to the court rules so I filed a motion for summary judgement, but I was still ignored. I moved back to South Carolina not long after this, but my experience in filing this suit showed me what I needed to know concerning the labor of working people and the labor cannibals. We are slaves, and the court doesn't want to deal with cases that argue slavery when they the person making the argument has done their homework. Perhaps that's why the feds don't prosecute workers who make slavery arguments yet, and I doubt that they'd want such a case to get up to the Supreme Court because they know that the Court has not ruled on the slavery questions concerning the taxing powers. Dred Scott stirred things up 150 years ago, and the next Dred Scott could stir things up again.

Going back to Frederick Douglass, he described the system on Col. Lloyd's slave plantation. He said: "Its whole public was made up of and divided into three classes, slaveholders, slaves, and overseers. Its blacksmiths, wheelwrights, shoemakers, weavers, and coopers, were slaves."19 In an institution of cannibalistic slavery, where the rights to labor are secured without the masters having to purchase those rights first, the same division is apparent. The "slaveholders" are the people who make the laws; the "slaves" are the people who work for a living, and the "overseers" are the police and the courts. Today's plantation is a lot bigger, for it encompasses entire nations. If the shoe fits, wear it. As Solomon said long ago: "That which has come to be, that is what will come to be; and that which has been done, that is what will be done; and so there is nothing new under the sun."20 Where Congress fits in, it's hard to say. They aren't part of the lawmaking body since they don't write any laws, but they put a word or two in from time to time. They act as a rubber-stamp to legalize laws written by Executive bureaucrats. So I guess they're the middle-man between the slaveholders and the overseers. The Congress has been reduced to a highly paid talking shop.

The authority of the police has been greatly enhanced by the Supreme Court since it was packed. In the 1982 term of the Court, the case of Briscoe v. LaHue was decided. This case ruled that police officers can knowingly and maliciously lie on the witness stand and cause you to get sent to prison; and even if you can prove that the officer committed perjury, you couldn't sue the officer for violating your rights. The Court said: "The plaintiff could not recover even if the witness knew the statements were false and made them with malice."21 Three justices dissented, and part of the dissenting opinion said: "Police officers and other government officials differ significantly from private citizens, around whom the common-law doctrines of witness immunity developed. A police officer comes to the witness stand clothed with the authority of the state. His official status gives him credibility and creates a far greater potential for harm than exists when the average citizen testifies. The situation is aggravated when the official draws on special expertise. A policeman testifying about a fingerprint identification or a medical examiner testifying as to the cause of death can have a critical impact on a defendant's trial. At the same time, the threat of criminal perjury prosecution, which serves as an important constraint on the average witness' testimony, is virtually nonexistent in the police-witness context. Despite the apparent prevalence of police perjury, prosecutors exhibit extreme reluctance in charging police officials with criminal conduct because of their need to maintain close working relationships with law enforcement agencies. The majority thus forecloses a civil sanction in precisely those situations where the need is most pressing."22

In the case of Imbler v. Pachtman, decided in the 1975 term of the Supreme Court, the court ruled that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from being sued for malicious prosecution. In this case, the prosecutor was sued for knowingly using false testimony and suppressing material evidence at Imbler's murder trial, thus causing Imbler to get convicted and sent to prison. What this case did was say that if a prosecutor maliciously prosecuted you using false testimony and suppressed evidence that could help prove your innocence, you couldn't sue him for violating your rights. He has absolute immunity.

As far a immunity for judges, the Supreme Court of Labor Cannibalism has shielded them from being sued too. In the 1977 term of the Supreme Court, in the case of Stump v. Sparkman, a 15 year old woman was sterilized by the order of an Indiana circuit court. Let's read the gist of the case: "A mother filed a petition in affidavit form in an Indiana Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction under an Indiana statute, for authority to have her ‘somewhat retarded' 15-year-old daughter sterilized, and petitioner Circuit Judge approved the petition the same day in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without notice to the daughter or appointment of a guardian ad litem. The operation was performed shortly thereafter, the daughter having been told that she was to have her appendix removed. About two years later she was married, and her inability to become pregnant led her to discover that she had been sterilized. As a result she and her husband filed suit in Federal District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her mother, the mother's attorney, the Circuit Judge, the doctors who performed or assisted in the sterilization, and the hospital where it was performed, seeking damages for the alleged violation of her constitutional rights."23 This "somewhat retarded" girl had attended public school and was promoted each year with her class. The majority of the Court ruled that Judge Stump could not be sued because he had absolute immunity while acting in his judicial capacity. Three justices dissented. The dissenting justices thought that the grounds upon which the majority upheld Judge Stump's absolute immunity were "factually untrue" and "legally unsound." The dissent stated that "what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was in no way an act ‘normally performed by a judge.' Indeed, there is no reason to believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other Indiana judge, either before or since...... But false illusions as to a judge's power can hardly convert a judge's response to those illusions into a judicial act. In short, a judge's approval of a mother's petition to lock her daughter in the attic would hardly be a judicial act simply because the mother had submitted her petition to the judge in his official capacity...... A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity."24

Another case involving judicial immunity was Pierson v. Ray, decided in the 1966 term of the Court. This case was sort of a Rosa Parks situation, where blacks, by the force of law, were segregated from whites. In this case 15 white and Negro Episcopal clergymen attempted to use segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961. They were arrested for violating Mississippi law and sentenced to 4 months in jail and a $200 fine each, the maximum sentence allowed by law. An appeal was made to the County Court and the charges were dropped. After this, the clergymen brought suit in Federal District Court for false arrest and imprisonment. A jury trial ensued and the jury found in favor of the clergymen. But on appeal the jury verdict was brought to nothing because the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion. The Supreme Court upheld this position. I guess we've gone back to the doctrine "The King can do no wrong." In footnote #5 of Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, he pointed this out. He said: "Historically judicial immunity was a corollary to that theory. Since the King could do no wrong, the judges, his delegates for dispensing justice, ‘ought not to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption for this tends to slander the justice of the King.' Because the judges were the personal delegates of the King they should be answerable to him alone."25 Justice Douglas pointed out that this type of judicial reasoning existed back the Star Chamber days four centuries ago. There is nothing new under the sun.

I could go on further, but I think that this is enough to enable the reader to see what has happened to the legal system since the New Deal transformed it. So, if you find yourself being criminally prosecuted in the future, remember that the judge, the prosecuting attorney, and the police officers are all immune from being sued if they violate your constitutional rights by using false testimony and suppress evidence that could prove your innocence. But let's go on to the next chapter. It get's worse.

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1. Jefferson Davis: The Essential Writings, edited by William Cooper Jr., The Modern Library, N.Y., 2004, pg. 155

2. The Saturday Evening Post, May 16, 1936, pp. 5, 7

3. The Saturday Evening Post, July 20, 1935, pp. 5, 48

4. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 US 277, 299

5. Helvering v. Davis, 301 US 672, 638

6. Cheek v. U.S., 498 US 192, 203

7. Supra., 206

8. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189, 207

9. The Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1935, pp. 5-7

10. The Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1935, pp. 7, 36, 38

11. Cheek v. U.S., 498 US 192, 197

12. Supra.

13. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself, Park Publishing Co., Hartford, Conn., 1882, pg. 45

14. The Saturday Evening Post, September 15, 1934, pg. 88

15. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, pg. 211

16. Ibid., pp. 212-13

17. Ibid., pp.214-15

18. The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. III, pg. 39.

19. The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, pg. 40

20. Ecclesiastes, 1: 9.

21. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 US 325, 331, 332

22. Supra., 365, 366

23. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US 349, Syllabus

24. Supra., 367

25. Pierson v. Ray, 386 US 547, 566

Go to Chapter IV

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